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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the European Union entered the worst crisis in its
history. In the wake of a global financial crisis and economic
recession, the Greek government revealed that its 2009 budget deficit
would be more than four times higher than the three percent of Gross
Domestic Product permissible under the rules of Economic and
Monetary Union (“EMU”).1 The unsustainability of the Greek deficit
and debt resulted in a bailout by the European Union and the
International Monetary Fund, the first of three bailouts that Greece
received between 2010 and 2015. Other countries bailed out during
that time, because of their failing banks or unmanageable sovereign
debts, included Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus.2
The euro crisis was highly consequential for the European Union
because it threatened the future of EMU, arguably the European
Union’s most iconic and politically important achievement. A Greek
departure from the Eurozone, either of its own volition or at the
behest of other Eurozone members, seemed distinctly possible by
2015. This could have been disastrous not only for Greece, but also

* Ad personam Jean Monnet Chair in European Public Policy, George Mason University.
1. See Greece’s Sovereign Debt Crunch: A Very European Crisis, ECONOMIST (Feb. 4,
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15452594.
2. See PAUL WALLACE, THE EURO EXPERIMENT (2016).
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for the credibility and stability of the Eurozone. The interconnection
between the internal market—the European Union’s most noteworthy
economic achievement—and monetary union meant that
destabilization of the Eurozone would have had widespread
repercussions for the European Union as a whole. Clearly, the euro
crisis endangered the entire European project.
In 2014, a crisis in Ukraine, triggered by Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and support for militant separatists in the east of the country,
sent additional shock waves throughout the European Union.3 The
Ukraine crisis did not threaten the existence of the European Union or
the future of a core EU policy area, but it tested EU solidarity and the
effectiveness of EU policy toward Russia.4 Potentially much more
damaging for the European Union was the onset in 2015 of yet
another crisis, this time caused by a massive inflow of migrants, due
to the escalating war in Syria and instability elsewhere in the Middle
East and North Africa. The migration crisis was first and foremost a
humanitarian catastrophe. Beyond that, it further tested EU solidarity
and demonstrated the fundamental weakness of the Schengen freetravel regime, notably the porousness of the European Union’s
external borders and the failure so far to develop an effective asylum
and immigration policy. Just as the euro crisis jeopardized the future
of EMU, so did the refugee crisis jeopardize the future of Schengen.5
The European Union is no stranger to crisis. Indeed, the history
of European integration, stretching back to the early post-World War
II period, is replete with events that been called crises, regardless of
their severity.6 The current crisis, embracing the euro, Ukraine, and
refugee crises, as well as related political problems pertaining to weak
legitimacy and growing Euroskepticism, and related economic
problems pertaining to persistent sluggish growth and high
unemployment, is different. It threatens to undermine or possibly
destroy core policy areas such as monetary union and Schengen, and
to change the character of the European Union fundamentally. After
3. See House of Lords, The EU and Russia Before and Beyond the Ukraine Crisis,
European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2014-2015, Feb. 20, 2015,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf;
see
generally ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE CRISIS: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WEST (2014).
4. See id.
5. See Europe’s Migrant Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874.
6. See DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION (2d ed.
2014).
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more than sixty years of European economic and political integration,
for the first time the European Union faces the prospect of
disintegration. As if to highlight the European Union's woes, in June
2016 a majority of United Kingdom voters, in a referendum on
European Union membership, decided that their country should
leave.7
The political salience and fast-moving nature of the crisis have
required the close and near-constant involvement of the European
Union’s leaders. This begs an obvious but not easily answered
question: who leads the European Union? Unlike national political
systems, the European Union does not have a government. Instead, it
has a set of governing institutions. The European Union’s core, dayto-day, decision-making institutions are the European Commission,
the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament
(“EP”). Each has a President: the European Commission President
holds a five-year mandate; the EP President is elected for a two-anda-half year period; and the presidency of the Council rotates among
national governments every six-months. A fourth institution is not
involved in day-to-day decision-making, but is paramount politically
in the European Union. That institution is the European Council,
whose membership consists of the most senior political leaders in the
member states—each country’s head of state or government—
together with the European Commission President and the European
Council’s own President. The national leaders are the European
Council’s principals: only they may participate in European Council
decision-making, as distinct from discussions and deliberations.8
Although the European Council has a relatively small number of
treaty-mandated policy and procedural responsibilities, such as
approving enlargement of the Eurozone or of the European Union
itself, or choosing the President of the European Central Bank
(“ECB”), it is also responsible for providing overall direction for the
European Union.9 The European Council was not part of the
European Union’s original institutional architecture, but emerged in
the mid-1970s as a forum in which national leaders could discuss a
7. See generally STEVE PEERS, BREXIT: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL
FROM THE EU OR FOR RENEGOTIATION OF THE EU (2016).
8. See generally JOHN PETERSON & MICHAEL SHACKLETON, THE INSTITUTIONS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION (3d ed. 2012).
9. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 15 ¶ 1, 2012 O.J. C
326/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
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myriad of challenges confronting the then European Community,
which at the time was mired in economic recession and political
sclerosis. Only the national leaders, it seemed, had the power and
perspective to get the European Community going again.10
Over the next thirty years, the European Council played a pivotal
role in reinvigorating European integration and brokering political
agreements that made possible everything from the launch of the
single market program in the late 1980s, the European Union in 1993,
and monetary union in 1999; to successive rounds of major treaty
reform in 1986 (the Single European Act), 1992 (the Maastricht
Treaty), 1997 (the Amsterdam Treaty), 2001 (the Nice Treaty), and
2007 (the Lisbon Treaty); to successive rounds of enlargement in
1995, 2004, 2007, and 2013, as a result of which the European Union
expanded from twelve to twenty-eight member states. Throughout
that time, despite having become the EU’s most important decisionmaking body, the European Council was not officially an EU
institution. That changed in December 2009, with the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty, which not only recognized the European
Council as a full-fledged institution but also authorized it to elect its
own president, by a qualified-majority vote, for a two-and-a-half year
period, renewable once.11 Hitherto, the presidency of the European
Council had rotated among national leaders in the same way as the
presidency of the Council of the European Union continues to rotate
among national governments.12
Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty coincided with the onset of
the EU crisis.13 In addition to its ordinary business, which often
included dealing with extraordinary events, the European Council
found itself having to cope with a crisis far more serious than any in
the history of the European Union. The EP President had much to say
about the crisis, but his political influence was circumscribed by the
10. See JEAN-MARC HOSCHEIT & WOLFGANG WESSELS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:
1974-1986: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS (1988); JAN WERTS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
(2008).
11. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 9, art. 15 ¶ 5.
12. See generally EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL PRESIDENCIES: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Ole Elgström ed., 2003); THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND EUROPEAN
GOVERNANCE: THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS OF THE EU (François Foret & Yann-Sven
Rittelmeyer eds., 2014); see also WERTS, supra note 10; WOLFGANG WESSELS, THE
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2015).
13. See Desmond Dinan, How Did We Get Here?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW
DOES IT WORK? 41 (4th ed. 2015).
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Parliament’s institutional role and by his non-membership in the
European Council. Historically, the President of the European
Commission is a more prominent player in the European Union, and
is also a member of the European Council. In recent years, however,
the political influence of the Commission presidency has declined, as
national leaders have grown more jealous of their prerogatives and
more forceful in the conduct of EU affairs.14 With the onset of the
crisis, national leaders have availed of the existence of the European
Council, and of their special status as principals within it, to confront
the unparalleled challenge facing the European Union. The
institution’s new president assists national leaders within the
European Council, not least in combatting the crisis.
This article examines the performance of the European Council
President in coping with the current EU crisis. Under ordinary
circumstances—a European Union not in crisis—the arrival of a new
institutional actor would be of considerable interest to EU scholars
and observers. The contemporaneous onset of the crisis and
inauguration of the European Council presidency was fortuitous and
has focused additional attention on the new office, and the new office
holders. How significant is the European Council presidency? What
capacity does the presidency have to provide leadership in the
European Union? How effective have the initial office holders been?
What contribution has the European Council president made to EU
crisis resolution?
I. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT
The decision to institute a European Council President reflected
the increasing prominence and growing workload of the European
Council.15 During the Convention of the Future of Europe in 20022003, which paved the way for the ultimately unratified
Constitutional Treaty, a number of national representatives floated the
idea of replacing the rotating presidency of the European Council
14. See generally REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN, JULIE HASSING NIELSEN & CATHARINA
SØRENSEN, SWED. INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., THE DANISH EU PRESIDENCY 2012: A MIDTERM
REPORT (2012), http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2012_1op.pdf.
15. See generally Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson & Uwe Puetter, The New
Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era, 53 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 703 (2015); Uwe Puetter, Europe’s Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the
Council and European Council in EU Economic Governance, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 161
(2012).
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with a standing, elected President. Their rationale was to improve the
functioning of the European Council by providing consistency in the
preparation and conduct of meetings, continuity from one meeting to
the next, and follow-through after each meeting, thereby improving
the effectiveness of the European Union as a whole. They also hoped
to enhance the European Union’s international standing by making
the European Council President a focal point of the European Union’s
external representation.
The idea was not without controversy, not least because its
champions were the representatives of big member states, notably
France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. For their part,
representatives of some small member states feared that the big
member states would monopolize the proposed new position, which
would reinforce what they saw as a troubling imbalance of national
power in the European Union. Small member states would especially
miss the influence and international stature that came with
occasionally presiding over the European Council. Eventually,
representatives of reluctant member states were won over by the
obvious need to improve the functioning of the European Council,
and by concessions in other institutional arrangements. Accordingly,
European Council reform became part of the Constitutional Treaty
and of the ensuing, and ultimately successful, Lisbon Treaty.16
On December 1, 2009, the day on which the Lisbon Treaty
entered into force, Herman van Rompuy became the European
Council’s first elected president.17 Van Rompuy was reelected for a
second term in mid-2012.18 Donald Tusk, so far the only other person
to hold the position, succeeded Van Rompuy in December 2014.19
16. See generally SIMONE BUNSE, SMALL STATES AND EU GOVERNANCE: LEADERSHIP
THROUGH THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY (2009); CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., EGMONT & EUR.
POL’Y CTR., THE TREATY OF LISBON: A SECOND LOOK AT THE INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS
(2010),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2010/09/Studia_Lisbonne_II%
20COPYRIGHT.pdf; DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE (Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John
Erik Fossum & Agustín José Menéndez eds., 2004); PETER NORMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL
CONSTITUTION: THE MAKING OF EUROPE’S CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (2d ed. 2005).
17. See Tony Barber, The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,
48 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 55, 55 (2010).
18. See Constant Brand, Second Term for Van Rompuy: European Council President
Re-elected, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/second-termfor-van-rompuy/.
19. See European Council Press Release EUCO 258/14, Remarks by President of the
European Council Donald Tusk at the Handover Ceremony with the Outgoing President
Herman Van Rompuy (Dec. 1, 2014).
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The two office holders are different in many respects. Van Rompuy
came from a small, old member state (Belgium); Tusk from a big,
new member state (Poland). Belgium was a founding member of the
Eurozone; Poland has not yet adopted the euro. Both have been prime
ministers of their respective countries, but Van Rompuy for less than
one year, Tusk for nearly seven years. Van Rompuy came from a
political tradition that values compromise and consensus building;
Tusk from a political tradition of confrontation and conflict. Van
Rompuy is unassuming and self-effacing; Tusk is assertive and
forceful. Each brought to the job a different set of abilities and
skills.20
Personal qualities matter greatly in any presidential position, but
especially in a job that involves dealing on a daily basis with the EU’s
national political leaders who, as a rule, are extremely competitive,
have towering egos, and are used to special treatment. All national
leaders are equal in the European Council but, given the nature of
international politics, some are more equal than others. The
Chancellor of Germany and the President of France have privileged
positions in the European Council, reflecting their countries’
economic and political ascendancy in the European Union and iconic
partnership in the history of European integration. Other national
leaders vie for influence, based on their personal qualities and on their
countries’ particular circumstances. The European Council President
needs to tread carefully among the European Council’s principals.21
The onset of the EU crisis changed the dynamics of the
European Council and made additional demands on the European
Council President. An already difficult job became unexpectedly
arduous almost immediately after the new position came into being.
Meetings of the European Council became more frequent, their
conduct more urgent, and their outcomes more consequential. Though
symbolically still important, the Franco-German partnership gradually
gave way to undisguised German hegemony.22 As a result, the
20. See Desmond Dinan, The Post-Lisbon European Council Presidency: An Interim
Assessment, 36 WEST EUR. POL. 1256, 1256-73 (2013); A Task for Tusk, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21677211-polands-former-prime-ministerdesperately-seeks-ensure-europes-centre-can-hold-task.
21. See WOLFGANG WESSELS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2015).
22. See Simon Bulmer & William E. Paterson, Germany as the EU’s reluctant
hegemon? Of economic strength and political constraints, 20/10 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1387,
(2013); William E. Paterson, The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the
European Union, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 57, 57-75 (2011).
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German Chancellor occupied a special position within the European
Council. Greece, the weakest link in the Eurozone and in the
Schengen system, required careful handling in the European Council,
as did the United Kingdom, given the country’s negotiation of a
reform package as a precondition for the membership referendum. A
change of government in Poland in October 2015, when the
nationalist, conservative Law and Justice Party replaced Tusk’s Civic
Platform, caused intrinsic tension between the recently-elected
European Council President and the newly-elected Polish Prime
Minister.23
II. COPING WITH THE CRISIS
In December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the
global financial crisis and the great recession had already happened,
but the euro crisis had not yet occurred. Nevertheless, developments
in Greece were a cause of serious concern. So much so that an
extraordinary meeting of the European Council, which Van Rompuy
had convened in February 2010 to discuss the European Union’s
general economic circumstances, was devoted instead to the rapidly
deteriorating Greek situation.24 This would become the first of many
meetings of the European Council, either scheduled far in advance or
convened at short notice, devoted to the EU crisis between 2010 and
2015.
The EU Treaty calls for four meetings of the European Council a
year, but allows the President to convene extraordinary or special
meetings. Given the busy schedules of national leaders, convening an
extraordinary meeting of the European Council is not done easily or
lightly. The President would never do so without first contacting the
offices of key national leaders, at whose behest the President
occasionally convened such meetings. Nevertheless, the ability at
least to call for an extraordinary meeting gives the President a degree
of political influence by allowing him to put additional pressure on
national leaders to reach agreement on pressing issues. In addition to
the twenty regularly scheduled meetings of the European Council
held between 2010 and 2015, there were twenty-two extraordinary
23. See A Task for Tusk, supra note 20.
24. See Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union,
BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/112856.pdf.
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meetings, far more than during comparable periods in EU history.25
The profusion of extraordinary meetings demonstrated the seriousness
of the crisis. Although some national leaders complained about an
excessive number of extraordinary meetings, there was general
agreement within the European Council that the crisis warranted such
a response. There was also agreement that Van Rompuy and Tusk had
used their prerogative to convene extraordinary meetings wisely and
well.
As well as meeting in the European Council, leaders of countries
in the Eurozone began to meet separately in the Euro Summit, which
became institutionalized in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance of 2012, and whose rules of procedure the European
Council adopted in 2013.26 French President Nicolas Sarkozy
championed the Euro Summit, which he saw as the pinnacle of a new
system of economic governance for the Eurozone. National leaders
designated Van Rompuy President of the Euro Summit at the same
time that they re-elected him President of the European Council.27
Donald Tusk took over the presidency of both bodies when he
succeeded Van Rompuy, despite the fact that Poland, Tusk’s country
of origin, was not in the Eurozone.28 This demonstrated the
denationalization of the office of European Council President, even
though Tusk remained a controversial figure in Poland, an important
member state.
The Euro Summit met seven times between 2010 and 2012,
often immediately after meetings of the European Council. This
meant that leaders of countries not in the Eurozone often had to leave
the room before the Euro Summit could begin, thereby accentuating
the outsider status within the European Union of non-Eurozone
members. Moving difficult discussions about the euro crisis into a
separate forum for national leaders may have helped “facilitate
cohesion and consensus within the European Council,” which is a
responsibility of the European Council President, by avoiding
25. See Suzana Elena Anghel et al., European Council Oversight Unit, The European
Council and Crisis Management (Feb. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
IDAN/2016/573283/EPRS_IDA(2016)573283_EN.pdf.
26. See European Council, EUCO 23/13, European Council 14/15 March 2013:
Conclusions (Mar. 14, 2013).
27. See European Council Press Release, EUCO 37/12, Herman Van Rompuy ReElected President (Mar. 1, 2012).
28. See European Council, EUCO 163/14, Special Meeting of the European Council (30
August 2014): Conclusions (Aug. 30, 2014).
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ruptures between the euro ins and outs.29 But it emphasized the
inherent divisiveness of a highly important policy area from which
two member states (Denmark and the United Kingdom) had formal
opt-outs; in which one member state (Sweden) refused to participate;
and in which several Central and Eastern European member states
were not yet eligible to participate.
The Euro Summit met only once in 2013 and not at all in 2014,
reflecting a trough in the euro crisis and the fact that Sarkozy, the
main driving force behind the initiative, had left office. By contrast,
Tusk convened the Euro Summit three times within four weeks in
July-August 2015, when the crisis again escalated and Greece
required yet another bailout. In that case, the Euro Summit proved an
ideal forum in which to hammer out a financial assistance agreement
on which the future of the euro possibly hinged.
An added value of the standing European Council presidency
was that, unlike the previous, rotating presidency, the new President
could work exclusively and continuously on European Council
business. That meant being able to concentrate fully on preparing the
agenda of the European Council, overseeing the preparation of
background documents, and drafting the meetings’ conclusions. All of
this took place in close consultation with the offices of national
leaders and other EU institutional actors, notably the Commission
President. As with convening extraordinary summits, the European
Council President had some discretion in the performance of these
tasks. In particular, responsibility for sending formal letters of
invitation before each summit to other members of the European
Council gave the President some leeway in shaping the agenda.
Being fulltime also allowed the President to keep in contact with
members of the European Council between meetings, often by
visiting key principals in person, in order to ascertain their positions
on important agenda items. Based on detailed knowledge of most
national preferences and familiarity with the agenda, the standing
European Council President was generally in a better position than
presidents in the previous, rotating system to mediate among national
leaders and help forge agreement.30

29. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 9, art. 15 ¶ 6(c).
30. See Agnes Batory & Uwe Puetter, Consistency and Diversity? The EU’s Rotating
Council Presidency, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 95, 100-09 (2013).
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The political environment during the crisis was nevertheless
exceedingly challenging. Van Rompuy faced the powerful duopoly of
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela
Merkel during most of his first term in office. Merkel was slow to
respond to the euro crisis, initially underappreciating its magnitude.
Once she grasped the seriousness of the situation, Merkel reacted
cautiously. This reflected her sensitivity to domestic public opinion,
which blamed Greece for the country’s difficulties and was averse to
offering generous financial assistance. Merkel was equally sensitive
to the position of the German central bank, which saw itself as the
guardian of EMU orthodoxy and also opposed large-scale assistance
for Greece, and to the possibility of challenges before the German
constitutional court in the event that the government appeared to
exceed the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions on EMU. Only as the
extent of the Greek debacle became fully apparent did Merkel
concede to a bailout, with the involvement of the International
Monetary Fund together with the European Union, via the
Commission and the European Central Bank.31
Organizing the financial assistance packages—first on an ad hoc
basis, second by means of the temporary European Financial
Stabilization Mechanism and the European Financial Stability
Facility, and third by means of the permanent European Stability
Mechanism—took considerable time and effort in the European
Council and preoccupied its President in the early years of the crisis.
It helped that Van Rompuy was an economist by training and had
considerable familiarity with Belgium’s complicated public finances.
Financial assistance for countries in difficulty came with conditions
attached. Those conditions included drastic cuts in government
expenditure, higher rates of taxation or at least better rates of tax
collection, and structural economic reforms. This was consistent with
the policy of austerity, which Germany advocated as a cure for the
crisis. Having undertaken economic reforms in the early 2000s, and
amended its constitution in 2009 to include a balanced budget
provision, Germany wanted other EU countries to follow its lead,
even though many economists warned that fiscal retrenchment during

31. See FRANZ-JOSEF MEIERS, GERMANY’S ROLE IN THE EURO CRISIS: BERLIN’S
QUEST FOR A MORE PERFECT MONETARY UNION (2015).
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an economic downturn risked exacerbating unemployment and
sluggish growth.32
Intellectually, Van Rompuy may have understood the arguments
against austerity, but politically, he had little choice but to follow
Germany’s lead. Most national leaders found themselves in the same
position. As the European Union’s largest economy and most
influential member state, Germany was able to set the terms of the
European Council’s crisis response. Austerity policy had an
ideological edge; it was rooted in right-wing economic orthodoxy. It
was no accident that Germany’s pro-austerity government was
dominated by the center-right. Other center-right governments in the
European Union agreed with austerity; those on the center-left went
along with it either in deference to Germany or because of austerity’s
intrinsic appeal at a time of serious fiscal imbalances.
France, under the center-right presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy,
strongly supported austerity and strict conditionality for EU bailouts.
Within the European Council, Merkel and Sarkozy were close allies.
Largely at their behest, in 2011, national leaders negotiated the Treaty
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (“the Fiscal Compact”),
which committed its signatories to implement in national law
measures to ensure a balanced budget. Van Rompuy was instrumental
in drafting the Fiscal Compact, but would have preferred that it not
require EU Treaty change, given the likely ratification difficulties in
many member states. Britain did not agree to the Treaty, not because
of the government’s opposition to austerity—the Conservative
government was a major proponent of austerity—but because of
Britain’s aloofness from EMU and unwillingness to take on additional
EU obligations. As the Czech Republic also declined to participate,
only twenty-five of the then twenty-seven member states signed the
Fiscal Compact in March 2012, which formally was not part of the
EU Treaty framework.33
Merkel and Sarkozy’s tendency to work closely together, often
to the point of reaching agreement between themselves, which they
then imposed on the European Council, inevitably aroused the
antipathy of other national leaders. This put Van Rompuy in a
32. See generally Paul De Grauew & and Yuemei Ji, Panic-Driven Austerity in the
Eurozone and its Implications, VOXEU.ORG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/
panic-driven-austerity-eurozone-and-its-implications.
33. See generally European Council Press Release, Fiscal Treaty Signed: Strengthened
Fiscal Discipline and Convergence in the Euro Area (Mar. 2, 2012).
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difficult position. On one hand, he had to be sensitive to the
preferences of Merkel and Sarkozy, the EU’s most powerful national
politicians. On the other hand, he could not ignore the concerns of
other European Council members. A widespread perception that he
had been selected as European Council President largely at the behest
of Merkel and Sarkozy deepened Van Rompuy’s dilemma. His
propensity to support Merkel and Sarkozy, out of either conviction or
convenience, reinforced the perception that he was indeed their man.34
The election of François Hollande as President of France in May
2012 changed the tenor of Franco-German relations in the EU, as did
France’s increasingly evident economic weakness. Hollande, a
socialist, opposed austerity. Moreover, he had promised during the
campaign that, if elected, he would stand up to Merkel. Hollande
found eager allies among other national leaders who also resisted
Germany’s leadership and whose countries suffered from the impact
of austerity. Matters came to a head at an ill-tempered meeting of the
European Council in June 2012 when Merkel was put on the
defensive.35 Once again, Van Rompuy was torn between two
extremes and tried to bridge the difference. Opinion within the
European Council soon swung back in Merkel’s favor, reflecting the
predominance of Germany’s position and the inherent logic of
Franco-German relations. Despite his opposition to austerity,
Hollande realized that France could not stand apart from Germany
and act independently in the European Union.
Despite having to hew closely to Merkel’s position, Van
Rompuy had some influence of his own on the European Council’s
crisis response. In March 2010, at the outset of the crisis, EU leaders
asked him to “establish, in cooperation with the Commission, a Task
Force with representatives of the Member States, the rotating
Presidency [of the Council] and the ECB” to report on “the measures
needed to [remedy the crisis], exploring all options to reinforce the

34. See Jean-Claude Juncker on Saving the Euro: ‘It Would Be Wrong to Create
Taboos’, DER SPIEGEL (Jan. 24, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
jean-claude-juncker-on-saving-the-euro-it-would-be-wrong-to-create-taboos-a-741183.html.
35. See Pierre de Boissieu et al, Saving the Euro, in NATIONAL LEADERS AND THE
MAKING OF EUROPE: KEY EPISODES IN THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Pierre de
Boissieu et al. eds., 2015) at 258-75; see also European Council, EUCO 76/12, European
Council 28/29 June 2012: Conclusions (June 29, 2012).
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[European Union’s] legal framework.”36 Building on the work of the
2010 Task Force, Van Rompuy directed a series of reports on
establishing “a genuine EMU,” released under the auspices of the
presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the
Eurogroup (of Eurozone finance ministers), and the European Central
Bank, which the European Council approved in December 2012.37
The fundamental weakness of EMU, which was apparent at the
time of the Maastricht negotiations, was the absence of a banking and
a fiscal union. Though willing to establish a monetary union, national
governments were unwilling to surrender additional sovereignty in the
areas of banking regulation and fiscal policy.38 Twenty years later, the
key to resolving the euro crisis seemed to be “More Europe:” finally
establishing a banking union and a fiscal union—core elements of
economic union—alongside monetary union. Van Rompuy, an ardent
European federalist, advocated such an outcome, buttressed by
political union.39 Even in the depths of the euro crisis, however, and
partly because of the political fallout from it, most national
governments refused to cede substantially more sovereignty to the
European Union. Few were willing to embark upon the timeconsuming and politically demanding intergovernmental negotiations
necessary to bring about the requisite EU Treaty change.
Though impressive by the standards of the Maastricht Treaty and
the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (an additional set of “rules of the
road” for EMU), the amount of legislation passed and number of
agreements reached to strengthen monetary union since the onset of
the crisis did not amount to a truly genuine EMU. Undoubtedly, the
framework for EMU was much more robust in 2015 than it had been
in 2010, with stronger economic governance, closer fiscal
coordination among national governments, and a rudimentary banking
union. This had been achieved on the basis of both supranational and
intergovernmental decision-making. Van Rompuy had helped nudge
36. GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN 2010 (Jan.
2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/2011/pdf/qc30
10507enc_pdf/.
37. See HERMAN VAN ROMPUY, TOWARDS A GENUINE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION (2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134
069.pdf.
38. See KENNETH DYSON & KEVIN FEATHERSTONE, THE ROAD TO MAASTRICHT:
NEGOTIATING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (1999).
39. See HERMAN VAN ROMPUY, EUROPE IN THE STORM: PROMISE AND PREJUDICE
(2014).
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the European Union toward deeper economic and political
integration, but would have liked it to go farther, in a supranational
direction. Being realistic, especially from the perspective of the
European Council presidency, he understood that national
governments had conceded as much as possible, under the
circumstances. Parts of the various reports that he helped draft were
intentionally aspirational rather than attainable.40 Such is the nature of
European integration.
The Ukraine crisis posed a different set of challenges for the EU,
for the European Council, and for the European Council President.
The crisis tested EU solidarity and the effectiveness of the EU’s
foreign and security policy. Variations of history, geography, and
economy among the EU’s member states explain disparities in
national governments’ dealings with Russia and reactions to the
unfolding events in Ukraine. Whereas all governments deplored
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for the separatist
movement in eastern Ukraine, some were reluctant to incur the cost of
imposing a wide range of economic sanctions against Russia. The
European Council discussed the Ukraine crisis throughout 2014 and
2015, including in several extraordinary meetings. Member states
soon forged a common position and gradually increased the intensity
of sanctions against Russia, despite Russia’s imposition of
countermeasures, which affected some member states more than
others. The downing of a Malaysian Airlines flight over eastern
Ukraine in July 2014, purportedly by separatists armed with Russian
missiles, outraged opinion in the European Union and strengthened
the resolve of the European Council to stand up to Russia.41
The European Council President played a prominent part in
orchestrating the European Council’s response to the Ukraine crisis.
As a former Prime Minister of Poland, a country having historically
tense relations with Russia, Donald Tusk, who became European
Council President in December 2014, took an especially keen interest
in the issue and advocated a tough EU response. Chancellor Merkel
and President Hollande took the lead in trying to broker an agreement
between Russia and Ukraine, with the support of the European
Council and its President. Though serious for the European Union, the
40. See id.
41. See Peter Spiegel & Geoff Dyer, EU and US Present United Front with Tough
Sanctions Against Russia, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
1905aac0-1738-11e4-87c0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz43IY1YnQ6.
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Ukraine crisis did not threaten core EU policies, or indeed the future
of the European Union, in the same way that the euro and migration
crises did. Nevertheless, the failure of the European Union to respond
forcefully to Russia’s aggression would have been a blow to its selfesteem and international credibility, especially during the debilitating
euro crisis.
No sooner had the Ukraine crisis ebbed—though not ended—in
2015 than the migration crisis erupted. An exodus of migrants from
North Africa, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2010, was a
harbinger of things to come. The loss of over 360 lives following a
shipwreck off the Italian island of Lampedusa, in October 2013,
shocked European opinion and promoted the European Council to call
for “determined action” to prevent such tragedies happening again.42
In addition, the European Council recognized the importance of
tackling the “root causes of migration flows,” and the need to
reinforce “Frontex activities in the Mediterranean” (Frontex is the
European Union’s border protection agency).43 Italy, the member
state most affected by large-scale migration across the Mediterranean,
pressed its EU partners to follow through on the European Council’s
conclusions, but little happened until the massive influx of migrants
into the European Union in summer 2015, as a result of the rapidly
deteriorating situation in Syria.
If developments in North Africa and the Middle East were the
“push” factors in the migration crisis, a crucial “pull” factor was
Chancellor Merkel’s announcement in September 2015 that Germany
would not impede the flow of migrants entering the country.44
Though laudable on humanitarian grounds, this proved to be a risky
declaration, as tens of thousands of migrants seized the opportunity to
reach Germany, a preferred destination for those seeking asylum or
better economic opportunities. There were no restrictions on crossborder travel within the Schengen Area, whose external borders were
supposedly secure. In fact, the external borders were extremely
porous. Moreover, the Dublin Regulation, which specifies procedures
for registering and processing asylum seekers as they enter the
42. See European Council, EUCO 169/13, European Council 24/25 October 2013:
Conclusions (Oct. 25, 2013).
43. Id.
44. See Mother Angela: Merkel’s Refugee Policy Divides Europe, DER SPIEGEL (Sept.
21, 2015, 5:21 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-of-chancellor
-merkel-divides-europe-a-1053603.html.
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European Union, proved unworkable when a sudden upsurge in
migrants inundated the system. A number of countries responded by
restoring intra-EU border restrictions, which is permitted under the
Schengen rules, as long as it is for a limited duration.45 As the crisis
escalated, the risk increased that temporary restrictions would become
permanent, and that Schengen would collapse.
In the meantime, the migration crisis posed serious humanitarian
and logistical challenges for Germany and a handful of other
countries to which migrants flocked in huge numbers. It posed a
particular challenge for Greece, the first EU country on the Balkan
route through which most migrants passed from the Middle East into
Europe. Relations between Germany and Greece were already
strained because of the euro crisis. As the migration crisis intensified,
relations deteriorated further, with Germany accusing Greece of not
fulfilling its Schengen obligations, notably with respect to border
security and implementing the Dublin Regulation. Some other
countries, which resented Germany’s advocacy of austerity during the
euro crisis, seemed to take malicious pleasure in Germany’s
newfound predicament, and were noticeably unenthusiastic about
helping Merkel solve the problem.
The enormity of the migrant crisis, together with the degree of
acrimony among member states, complicated efforts in the European
Council to find a solution. In addition to the regular meetings of the
European Council, Tusk convened three extraordinary meetings in
2015 to discuss the crisis. He also participated in summits between
the EU leaders and the leaders of non-EU countries directly affected
by the situation, notably Turkey and countries in the Western
Balkans. The European Council proposed various measures to cope
with the crisis, ranging from saving lives at sea; to fighting human
trafficking; to distributing migrants among all member states; to
setting up hotspots (areas on the border of frontline member states,
such as Greece and Italy, where migrants could be quickly registered
and processed); to providing financial and other assistance to non-EU
frontline states, especially Turkey; to strengthening the EU’s external
borders and reinforcing Frontex.46
45. See Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between
the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common
Borders, art. 2 ¶ 2, 1985, O.J. L 239.
46. See European Council, EUCO 169/13, supra note 42.
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Proposals such as these were easier to formulate than to
implement, especially in view of the scale of the crisis and the
political atmosphere in which it unfolded. What Tusk has identified as
a “delivery deficit”—the gap between the rhetoric of summit
conclusions and the reality of EU and member state action—has long
characterized the work of the European Council.47 One of the reasons
for establishing the standing presidency was to try to improve followthrough from European Council meetings, although the President’s
powers are limited to persuasion. Notwithstanding the existence of a
standing presidency, the migration crisis revealed the extent of the
European Council’s poor record of implementation in the face of
member states’ unwillingness to share the burden of relocation and
the cost of other emergency measures.
By 2016, the European Union was still far from having
overcome the migration crisis, while the euro crisis and Ukraine crisis
seemed to be dormant, though by no means resolved. The damage
caused to the European Union was considerable. The impact of the
crises tarnished the European Union’s image and further undermined
popular support for European integration. Euroskepticism—
opposition to the existence of the European Union or to particular its
policies and programs—soared. Under the circumstances,
governments were more likely to advocate specific national interests
than common European interests. Divisions within the European
Union widened between eurozone members and non-members;
between creditor and debtor countries; between older and newer
member states; between northern and southern, eastern and western
member states; between Germany and France; between Britain and
the rest. The fabric of European integration seemed to be fraying.
III. ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
The installation of a new European Council Presidency—the
replacement of a rotating, national presidency with a standing, elected
president—could not have come at a better or a worse time. The onset
of the crisis just as the first elected president took office meant that
the European Council was inherently better equipped to deal with a
47. European Council Press Release, EUCO 17/16, Report by President Donald Tusk to
the European Parliament on the Outcome of the December European Council (Jan. 19, 2016).
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series of unexpected and unexpectedly challenging events, but that the
new president faced a surprisingly difficult situation in a job that was
already extremely exacting. It is hard to imagine that the European
Council, for all its faults, would have managed as well as it did during
the last six years without a full-time president to provide continuity
between meetings, convene extraordinary sessions, and help draft the
roadmap for a stronger monetary union, apart from doing the usual
presidency work of preparing the agenda, chairing meetings, and
drafting conclusions. Clearly, in times of crisis or not, the European
Council is better served by having a standing presidency.
The European Council President is in a leading position in the
European Union’s leading institution but is not a leader of that
institution, let alone of the European Union. The two incumbents so
far are former prime ministers and therefore have prior experience of
the European Council and have had the same status as the European
Council’s current principals. But they are no longer on a par with
those principals. Their authority derives form their prior status and
experience and from having been elected as European Council
President. This gives the president considerable stature and visibility
in the European Union’s leadership structure but less than that of the
European Union’s most prominent national leaders.
Van Rompuy and Tusk brought different attributes and skills to
the task of crisis management. Van Rompuy’s ease with economics
allowed him to grasp complicated aspects of the euro crisis. Tusk is
less comfortable with economics, but apart from the tense
negotiations surrounding the third Greek bailout in 2015, he did not
have to focus as much as Van Rompuy on the euro crisis. By contrast,
Tusk is more familiar with foreign policy problems facing the
European Union, especially having to do with Russia. If anything,
Tusk may have been too forceful in advocating a tough position
against Russia, although this was what the European Council
eventually adopted. No European Council President or national leader
could have been prepared for the magnitude of the migration crisis.
As with the Ukraine crisis, Tusk was criticized for having pushed
national leaders during the migration crisis further than they seemed
willing to go. This may have reflected his recent experience as prime
minister of a large member state, when he was used to taking strong
stands rather than leading discreetly from a less prominent position.
The European Council President needs to be a good
communicator, within and outside the institution. The president
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makes frequent public appearances, speaking in settings ranging from
the European Parliament to universities and think tanks. The President
also engages extensively with media, ranging from post-summit press
conferences to one-on-one interviews. In general, however, the
president does not have a high public profile. The office of European
Commission President has been around much longer than that of the
European Council President and continues to attract more public
attention, though far less than a prime minister attracts in a member
state or than prominent national leaders attract in the European Union
as a whole. The European Council President has not become a wellknown public face of the European Union or even of the European
Council.
The most persistent criticism of the European Council’s handling
of the euro crisis is that it did too little, too late; and that austerity
impeded rather than aided the European Union’s economic recovery.
Even if valid, this criticism does not necessarily reflect badly on the
European Council President. Van Rompuy, in office during the worst
of the euro crisis, was hardly in a position to dissuade Merkel and
likeminded national leaders from advocating austerity. As for specific
measures to deal with the crisis, such as financial assistance packages
and new institutional arrangements for economic governance, Van
Rompuy played a relatively prominent and constructive role, without
which the European Union’s response may have been even less
satisfactory.
The crisis has been a wrenching experience for the European
Union. It has tested institutions and policies as never before. The
European Council, the European Union’s leading institution, has been
at the forefront of EU affairs during the crisis years. The standing
presidency has served the European Council well. Even if the
European Council President managed to ameliorate the crisis only
marginally, it was better to have a standing President than not. At a
time of grave crisis, having a steady hand on the European Council
tiller is surely not a bad thing.

